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Abstract
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Previous research proposes that peace is more likely 
to become durable if all rebel groups are included in 
the settlement reached. The argument implies that if 
actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military 
course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors 
that have signed an agreement. This article argues that 
all-inclusive peace deals – signed by the government 
and all rebel groups – are not the panacea for peace 
that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are 
strategic actors who are forward-looking when making 
their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the 
excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the 
risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to 
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already be factored into the decision-making calculus 
when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does 
not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from 
this theoretical argument are tested using unique data 
on the conflict behavior of the government and each of 
the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the 
post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with 
the theoretical expectations and show that whether an 
agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether 
the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate 
that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, 
this does not affect the signatories’ commitment to peace. 
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 Introduction 
A potential obstacle to durable peace, and an empirical reality of many civil wars, is 
that conflicts often involve numerous rebel groups. Cases in point are, for instance, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Sudan. Some scholars hold that if a peace agreement includes all the warring parties, 
peace is more likely to prevail (e.g. Hampson, 1996; Rubin, 2002). For instance, 
Licklider (2001: 701) stresses the importance of inclusiveness and points out that 
third parties ‘… should exert every effort to bring all of the important players into the 
process as soon as possible.’ The argument implies that the presence of excluded 
parties can jeopardize peace, not only by heightening the risk of violence involving 
the outside actors, but also by influencing the commitment to peace among the 
signatories. However, while many seem to expect that all-inclusive peace agreements 
are more likely to see peace prevail, this claim has so far not been examined in a 
quantitative study. The present study addresses this lacuna in previous research by 
providing a first test of this proposition. Hence, the purpose of this article is to 
explore whether all-inclusive peace agreements are more likely to provide durable 
peace than partial agreements that leave out one or more rebel groups. 
I argue that all-inclusive peace deals are not the panacea for peace that many 
seem to believe. If we think of parties in civil wars as strategic actors that look ahead 
when they make decisions, we can expect that the signatories have considered the 
possibility that excluded parties may continue to engage in armed conflict. Thus, the 
risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the 
decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal. This suggests 
that while the excluded actors may continue to fight, settlements leaving out one or 
more rebel groups should not necessarily make the signatories any more likely to 
engage in violence. 
Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data from 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on the conflict behavior of the 
government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts, 1989–2004. The 
statistical analysis is conducted employing a Cox proportional hazards model. The 
results are well in line with the theoretical argument. The findings show that whether 
an agreement leaves out one or more rebel groups does not affect whether the 
signatories stick to peace. At the same time, agreements that exclude some party are 
found to reduce the overall prospects for peace in the conflict, that is, when taking 
  2into account the conflict behavior of both signatories and non-signatories. Moreover, 
the results demonstrate that outside actors are more likely to engage in post-settlement 
violence than the signatories. Importantly, the findings show that even if parties are 
excluded, and continue to fight, this is not affecting the signatories’ commitment to 
peace.
1 Hence, the results indicate that partial peace is possible. 
 
Previous Research 
The amount of scholarly work devoted to the issue of how to end conflicts and move 
towards durable peace has increased in recent years (e.g. Fortna, 2003, 2004; Hartzell 
& Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2007; Walter, 1999, 2002b). However, while this 
field has seen significant advances, the literature on durable peace suffers from an 
unfortunate disconnect between the qualitative and quantitative research. Many case 
studies recognize that the rebel side often consists of several actors, and propose that 
various aspects such as spoiler dynamics can have implications for creating a lasting 
peace (e.g. Hampson, 1996; Stedman, 1997). Whereas case studies within the 
literature on durable peace emphasize that a refined view of the rebel side is needed, 
quantitative studies have, so far, mainly focused on two parties – the government and 
the opposition.
2  
In order to examine the question of whether to include all actors into peace 
agreements, as well as other pertinent issues, it is necessary to move beyond a 
characterization of civil war as involving only two parties. Indeed, by recognizing that 
civil wars often consist of multiple actors, we can begin to incorporate insights from 
case studies into our analyses of global patterns. 
This article addresses the claim in the case study literature that in order to 
ensure durable peace, it is essential that all parties are included in the settlement. 
Indeed, a key hypothesis is that an inclusive agreement, in which all actors with the 
                                                 
1 Note that the government may be a signatory to an agreement with one rebel group, and a non-signatory 
in relation to another rebel group. This means that even though the government in a strict sense is a 
signatory to one or more agreements, any conflict behavior between the government and an excluded rebel 
group is seen as violence involving non-signatories. 
2 There are some studies that do incorporate some aspects pertaining to the rebel side, but these do not 
explore the dyadic interactions of the government and each rebel group, which forms a significant part of 
the present study (e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003). 
  3potential to resume hostilities take part, is more likely to provide a sustainable 
solution (Ohlson & Söderberg, 2002). Hampson (1996: 217), for instance, argues that: 
  
…it is absolutely essential that all the warring parties have a seat at the 
negotiation table and are directly involved in discussions about the new 
constitutional and political order that will be created after the fighting stops. A 
‘good’ agreement is one that has been crafted by all parties to the conflict. If 
parties are excluded from these negotiations, or if their interests are not 
represented at the bargaining table, they will have a much stronger incentive to 
defect from the peace process and resort to violence to achieve their aims. 
 
Licklider (2001: 701) also argues in favor of inclusive peace agreements and stresses 
that third parties should try to get all of the important players into the agreement and 
‘…resist the temptation to settle for an easy agreement with moderates, (…) because 
such settlements are very likely to fail…’ Moreover, according to Rubin (2002: 100), 
actors on the outside of an agreement may try to disrupt an agreement reached. He 
suggests that: 
 
…one should probably attempt to include in negotiations all parties who are in a 
position to disrupt whatever settlement is arrived at; it may be more difficult to 
reach agreement with many parties and issues floating around, but if an 
agreement is reached under these circumstances, it will have a greater chance of 
surviving.  
 
Consequently, an agreement that includes all parties to the conflict should be more 
likely to ensure that peace prevails than a deal where one or several parties are 
excluded. The mechanisms underlying the argument on inclusiveness are not clearly 
spelled out, but most of the works on this topic implies that excluded parties can 
threaten the peace between the signatories. In this context, the literature on spoilers in 
civil wars is relevant (Ayres, 2006; Newman & Richmond, 2006; Stedman, 1997; 
Zahar, 2003).
3 Indeed, the argument on inclusiveness seems to suggest that if an actor 
                                                 
3 Stedman (1997: 5) defines spoilers as: ‘…leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to 
achieve it.’ Note that the present study treats all warring parties as potential spoilers, and hence, does not 
focus specifically on spoiler violence. 
  4on the outside continues to pursue the military course, this can have a destabilizing 
effect on the actors that have signed an agreement.
4 Thus, according to previous 
research, an agreement that leaves out one or more parties should increase not only 
the risk that excluded parties engage in violent conflict, but also make the signatories 
more likely to fight.  
 
Signatories Sticking to Peace 
The claim that all parties should be included in a peace deal is appealing and seems to 
make intuitive sense. However, applying insights from bargaining theory, which 
emphasize the strategic nature of conflict, calls this into question. The bargaining 
perspective depicts war and its resolution as a bargaining process and at the center 
stage of analysis is the strategic interaction of the parties. The parties are seen to be 
acting strategically when ‘…each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how 
other actors behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into 
account’ (Lake & Powell, 1999: 3). Scholars are increasingly arguing that parties in 
civil wars are to be seen as strategic actors who are forward-looking and try to 
anticipate the actions of other actors when making their decisions (e.g. Cetinyan, 
2002; Walter, 2006). In this bargaining process between the warring parties revealing 
information plays a key role. By engaging in fighting and taking part in negotiations, 
the parties can reveal information about their reservation price (i.e. the minimum they 
can accept) and thus facilitate a settlement, instead of fighting a costly war. Whereas 
some actors may have revealed enough information about their capabilities and 
resolve in order to reach a bargain, the beliefs of others have not converged (i.e. they 
have different expectations about the outcome) and have yet to agree on a mutually 
preferable deal (Fearon, 1995; Filson & Werner, 2002). 
Applying these insights, I propose that all-inclusive peace agreements are not 
necessarily more likely to provide peace than a deal that leaves out some actor. The 
argument in previous research suggests that settlements that do not include all parties 
increase the risk that the signatories engage in conflict, primarily as a consequence of 
violence from the excluded parties. But if we consider that the warring parties are 
                                                 
4 While not explicitly stated in the literature, it is conceivable that the signatories are influenced not only by 
direct spoiler attacks intended to wreck the peace, but it may also, for various reasons, be more difficult for 
the signatories to stick to peace if the non-signatories continue to pursue their war.  
  5strategic actors that try to anticipate the decisions of all other actors, this yields other 
expectations. I argue that the signatories, when taking the decision to sign a deal, are 
trying to anticipate the actions of all actors in the conflict, including rebel groups 
outside of the peace agreement. 
The warring parties that decide to sign an agreement know if there are 
excluded parties, and presumably they have considered the possibility that the actors 
on the outside may continue to fight. The fact that the government and the excluded 
parties are unable to reach a deal suggests that they do not share the same expectation 
concerning the likely outcome on the battlefield, and hence, will continue to pursue 
the military course. Still, some parties may have the same expectations about the 
outcome without necessarily signing an agreement, and it is also conceivable that an 
excluded group may have been marginalized due to its insignificance, or may be 
weakened as the government redirects its forces against parties outside of an 
agreement. This could, hence, make violence involving outside actors less likely. 
However, on average, it is more plausible to expect that excluded parties will engage 
in violence. 
This is not to say that the signatories in civil war are able to anticipate every 
move by the outside actors. In some instances the signatories may for some reason 
expect that the non-signatories will refrain from using violence. But since excluded 
actors in general are likely to fight, it is probably more common that the signatories 
expect that outside actors will engage in conflict. Moreover, the argument is not 
implying that signatories always stick to peace, while the non-signatories do not. 
Certainly, some signatories may have signed an agreement without having benign 
intentions, and even if the signatories do intend to stick to peace, commitment 
problems may serve to increase the risk of violence.
5 This said, the non-signatories 
should probably be more likely to engage in violence following a settlement than the 
signatories. Hence, the signatories should have a fairly good sense of the violent 
challenges they may be facing, and therefore, take such a scenario into account when 
signing the deal. 
                                                 
5 A credible commitment problem can arise when the parties agree on the bargaining range and would like 
to avoid the costs of war, but fear that the other party may renege on the deal. See, for instance, Walter 
(2002b). 
  6The fact that this argument calls into question the necessity of all-inclusive 
deals may at first glance seem discouraging. However, the argument rather implies 
that there may be many different paths to peace, since the signatories are expected to 
commit to peace, even if some party is left on the outside. Hence, agreements that 
exclude some actors may be one way forward when an all-inclusive deal is not 
possible. 
There are several testable implications that follow from my theoretical 
argument. To begin with, focusing on the settlement as such, it is possible to draw out 
two implications. First, whether a peace agreement is all-inclusive or not, is not likely 
to affect the signatory peace (i.e. whether peace prevails in terms of all the signatories 
sticking to peace). The second implication is that since the excluded parties are likely 
to continue to fight, an agreement that leaves out one or more rebel groups should 
reduce the overall prospects for peace (i.e., whether peace prevails in the entire 
conflict taking into account the conflict behavior of both signatories and non-
signatories). In other words, if the agreement fails to include some rebel group, this 
should not affect whether the signatories stick to peace, but is likely to reduce the 
overall prospects for peace since the non-signatories may engage in conflict. 
Furthermore, if we move the analysis to the dyadic interactions between the 
government and each of the rebel groups, there are some additional implications. The 
third implication is that the non-signatories, on average, should be more likely to 
engage in post-settlement violence than the signatories. Fourth, focusing specifically 
on the signatory dyads, the argument suggests that each of these should not be any 
more likely to resort to violence if the deal excludes some actor. The fifth and last 
implication takes this notion of exclusion one step further. Even if the signatories are 
faced with excluded parties that engage in conflict, we should not expect to see an 
increase in the risk of signatory violence. By examining these implications from my 
theoretical argument this article aims to shed light on the issue of whether all-





The data are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and include all internal 
armed conflicts where at least one peace agreement has been signed during the period 
  71989–2004.
6 The UCDP defines an internal armed conflict as a contested 
incompatibility over government and/or territory, between a government and an 
opposition organization, and which reaches the level of minor armed conflict, that is, 
at least 25 battle-related deaths in at least one year. The UCDP dataset covering the 
post-Cold War period is unique in that it includes yearly data on all rebel groups 
involved in an armed conflict with the government that has reached at least this level 
of battle-deaths. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to have comparable 
yearly data on the conflict behavior involving the government and each of the rebel 
groups. Hence, this dataset will be used. 
Each internal armed conflict consists of one or more dyads, where the 
government and each rebel group engage in violence reaching the level of 25 battle-
related deaths in at least one year. Hence, there may be two or more warring parties, 
of which one is always the government. In this study a party that prior to the peace 
agreement met the criterion of ‘warring party’ is of interest, and the government and 
these rebel groups may, or may not, have signed a peace agreement in the conflict. 
The reason for focusing on the warring parties is that these have been active in the 
conflict and at some point had both the incentives and capabilities to use armed 
violence. 
The UCDP also provides a comprehensive dataset of all peace agreements 
signed in the post-1989 period. Some other lists of peace agreements only focus on 
the settlements signed by all, or the major warring parties (e.g. Walter, 1999: 127–
128, 2002b: 52). For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to include all peace 
agreements and not merely those signed by certain rebel groups. The dataset from the 
UCDP includes agreements where only some of the rebel groups are signatories. 
Hence, this study covers all peace agreements that are signed by the government and 
one or several rebel groups, and which address the incompatibility by settling all or 
part of it (UCDP, 2006).
7 The data used consists in total of 82 peace agreements in 40 
internal armed conflicts, and some of the conflicts stand out in terms of the number of 
                                                 
6 If not otherwise mentioned, the data in this study comes from the UCDP. For definitions of concepts, 
see UCDP (2006) and Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen (2006). Note that since the conflict behavior of 
the parties is assessed the year after the signing of a peace agreement, and this data has been available up till 
2004, only agreements up till 2003 are included in the study. 
7 In line with previous research I do not study ‘peace process agreements’ since these are merely ‘outlining 
a process for regulating or resolving the incompatibility’ (Sollenberg, 2002: 14). 
  8agreements signed: for example, in Chad nine peace agreements were reached in the 
period under study. Other conflicts, such as the one in Congo-Brazzaville, have only 
seen one peace agreement during the same period. 
 
Statistical Technique and Structure of the Datasets 
The empirical evaluations are conducted using duration analysis. In this case the 
interest lies in the duration of peace after the signing of a peace agreement, up to the 
point where the warring parties may engage in post-settlement armed conflict (i.e. 
experience an event), if at all. I use a Cox proportional hazards model which has the 
advantage of not assuming a specific parametric form for its distribution (Cox, 1972). 
In an effort to evaluate the issue of inclusiveness as thoroughly as possible, 
two different datasets have been constructed, one focusing on the settlement level, 
whereas the other shifts the focus to the dyadic interactions between the government 
and each rebel group. When analyzing the settlement level, the unit of analysis is the 
post-agreement-year, whereas the analysis at the dyadic level concerns the 
government and each rebel group, and the unit of analysis is the post-agreement-dyad-
year. In the dyadic dataset there may be several dyads in a conflict, where the 
government remains the same in each dyad. 
In both datasets the peace agreements and dyads, respectively, are at risk of 
experiencing an event – that is, armed conflict involving a government and a rebel 
group that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year – from the year after the 
signing of an agreement, until the observation period ends on the 31
st of December 
2004.
8 The first dataset consists of 82 peace agreements, and in the dyadic dataset 
there are in total 84 dyads, which may or may not have signed one or more 
settlements. Since some of the variables vary over time, models with time-varying 
covariates are used for both sets of data, which makes it possible to study changes 
over time. This means that there are multiple observations for each of the settlements 
and dyads, respectively. 
In the dyadic dataset, the dyads run the risk of experiencing post-settlement 
armed conflict after each of the agreements (if there are several signed in the 
                                                 
8 The primary focus is on the parties that were active prior to the signing of the agreement, and therefore 
new parties that later emerge are not taken into account in the main analysis. However, in the analysis at 
the settlement level a robustness check is conducted using an alternative dependent variable that captures 
the conflict behavior of new parties too.  
  9conflict).
9 Thus, in this dataset, the dyads may exit the risk set if they experience 
armed conflict following a settlement, and then reenter on the condition that a new 
settlement is reached. Note that whenever a settlement is reached by any of the rebel 
groups in the conflict, the settlement becomes analytically relevant for all dyads in the 
conflict, regardless of whether these are signatories or not. Some of the dyads may 
engage in post-settlement violence more than once. For example, in the conflict 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians, several peace agreements have been signed, 
and the non-signatory Hamas have engaged in violence with the Israeli government 
following more than one of these agreements. Hence, I employ a duration model that 




The post-settlement period is often more complex than peace simply prevailing or 
breaking down, therefore it is important that our dependent variables reflect what a 
durable peace may entail. Given that the signatories as well as the non-signatories 
may use violence after an agreement has been signed, it is important to take into 
account both these dimensions of peace duration.
11 Since the unit of analysis is 
different for the two sets of data, the dependent variables used for the settlement and 
dyadic level are not the same.  
In the analysis at the settlement level, two dependent variables are employed 
in order to capture different dimensions of peace duration, that is, the signatories’ 
commitment to peace, but also the overall peace duration in the conflict. The variable 
Signatory Peace Duration measures the number of years of peace from the signing of 
the agreement until the government and at least one of the other signatories engage in 
                                                 
9 Some dyads drop out of the data earlier either because the incompatibility is resolved or due to the fact 
that they cease to exist. For instance, if a rebel group completely dissolves or takes over the government 
the dyad drops out of the dataset. Based on information in the Uppsala Conflict Database, each of the 
parties in the dataset was evaluated according to these criteria in order to determine whether the dyad 
should continue to remain under observation or not (UCDP, 2006).  
10 More specifically, I use a conditional gap time model, see Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004: 159–161). 
11 It can be the government as well as any of the rebel groups that is the first to return to armed conflict 
after an agreement. While this is an interesting aspect to consider, the data used here does not make it 
possible to determine which actor that first resorts to violence. 
  10violence, or, if peace has prevailed, to the end of the observation period.
12 Hence, this 
variable focuses on the behavior of the signatories to the agreement. To exemplify, in 
Colombia, the peace agreement signed between the government and EPL in 1991, was 
not followed by armed conflict between the signatories until years later when, in 
2004, the fighting between the government and EPL again reached the level of minor 
armed conflict.
13 Meanwhile, FARC-EP and ELN, who did not sign the peace 
agreement, continued to fight. But since this variable is intended to only capture the 
conflict behavior of the signatories, this means that in terms of the signatory peace 
duration, peace prevailed for 13 years. 
In contrast, the variable Overall Peace Duration, takes into account the 
conflict behavior of the government, the other signatories to the agreement, as well as 
the non-signatories, that is, the warring parties that were standing outside of the deal. 
This variable is measured as the number of years of peace from the signing of the 
agreement until either a signatory or a non-signatory becomes involved in armed 
conflict, or if peace has prevailed, to the end of the observation period. Again, taking 
the example of Colombia, the fact that the government and the FARC-EP and ELN 
continued to fight is captured by this variable. Thus, whereas peace prevailed in 
Colombia for 13 years in terms of the signatory peace duration, the overall peace 
duration broke down immediately, as the non-signatories FARC-EP and ELN 
continued their struggle. 
In the analysis at the dyadic level, the dependent variable measures the conflict 
behavior of the government and a particular rebel group. The variable Dyadic Peace 
Duration captures whether the dyad, consisting of a government and a rebel group, 
was engaged in armed conflict from the signing of a settlement in the conflict, till the 
end of the observation period. Thus, in this case, the conflict behavior is measured for 
each dyad, and the rebel group may, or may not, be a signatory to a settlement. In 
Colombia, the dyad consisting of the government and EPL is at peace until 2004, 
whereas the dyads involving the government and FARC-EP and ELN, respectively, 
                                                 
12 Occasionally, there are several peace agreements reached in the same conflict. Of these, there are a few 
in which the signatories to the settlement already are at peace when they decide to reach another peace 
agreement. To avoid overestimating the impact that these agreements may have on peace duration, the 
subsequent agreement is seen as replacing the previous one.  
13 Some minor incidents are reported at various occasions during this period, but the violence concerning 
EPL does not in any given year reach 25 battle-related deaths until it does so in 2004.  
  11continued to fight and therefore experienced post-settlement armed conflict already 
the first time of observation, that is, the year following the agreement in 1991. 
In both datasets, the post-settlement armed conflict is measured as of the year 
following the peace agreement to ascertain that the violence has taken place after the 
settlement was signed. While it would have been preferable to measure the dependent 
variable directly after the signing of a settlement, the fact that it is the yearly 





A key aspect is the rebel groups’ inclusion or exclusion in relation to a particular 
peace agreement. The first variable Exclusive-Multiple,  which is used at the 
settlement level, is coded 1 if one or more rebel groups are standing on the outside of 
the deal, and is coded 0 otherwise. In order to account for the fact that two-party 
conflicts are all-inclusive by definition, this variable will be used together with the 
variable Two-Party Conflict, coded 1 if the conflict involves only two parties, and is 
coded 0 if the conflict involves three or more actors. By using these variables in the 
same model it becomes possible to assess the effect of partial agreements versus all-
inclusive agreements in a multiparty context. 
In the analysis at the dyadic level, the variable Excluded refers to a particular 
rebel group’s inclusion or exclusion in relation to a settlement. The variable is coded 
1 if the rebel group, in a given year, had not signed a peace agreement, and is coded 0 
if the rebel group had signed a peace agreement, or previously signed a peace 
agreement and then refrained from using violence.
15 In a sub-sample of the dyadic 
dataset covering all the signatories two other variables concerning exclusion are used. 
The first variable Exclusive-Peace Agreement is coded 1 if the dyad was a signatory 
to a deal that excluded some actor, and is otherwise coded 0. The second variable 
                                                 
14 The lowest peace duration is therefore one year, although a dyad may engage in conflict immediately 
after a settlement. 
15 This means that a group that has signed an agreement and then resorted to violence is considered to be a 
potential signatory to any subsequent peace agreement signed in the incompatibility. Thus, if another peace 
agreement is signed in the incompatibility and they remain on the outside of the deal, such a group is seen 
as excluded. Conversely, if a rebel group has signed an agreement and then refrained from using violence 
during the observation period, it is coded as included in any subsequent agreement. 
  12Excluded-Fight is coded 1 if there is one or more excluded parties that in a given year 
engages in conflict with the government, and if not, this variable is coded 0. 
The control variables in this study include such factors which previous 
research have argued to influence peace duration, and theoretically may affect the 
independent variables as well as the dependent variables. The control variables are 
basically the same for both levels of analysis, and where there is a difference this is 
pointed out. To begin with, it is essential to control for the number of parties in each 
conflict as this potentially can affect the results. The variable Number of Parties 
measures the number of warring parties that has been active in the conflict from 1989 
and onwards, up until the year in question. 
Although the findings are contradictory, previous research has indicated that 
the conflict duration increases the duration of peace, while the intensity of the conflict 
has been suggested to decrease peace duration (e.g. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 787; 
Fortna, 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2001: 202). In the dataset at the 
settlement level, the variable Conflict Duration counts the number of years since the 
conflict first reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths (which may be before 
1989), up to a given year. In the dyadic dataset, I control for Dyad-Conflict Duration, 
which is measured in the same way but starts counting from the year when a 
particular dyad first reached this threshold. Furthermore, the variable Conflict 
Intensity is used at the settlement level and is coded 1 if the conflict (either in the year 
of observation or previously) reaches the level of war, meaning more than 1000 
battle-related deaths in a year, and is otherwise coded 0. In the dataset at the dyadic 
level, I include the variable Dyad-Conflict Intensity which is coded in the same 
fashion as conflict intensity, but this variable instead captures whether a particular 
dyad has reached the level of war or not. Moreover, whether the conflict concerns a 
certain territory or power over the government can possibly affect the prospects for 
peace (e.g. Wallensteen, 2002; Zartman, 1995). Thus, I created a control variable 
Conflict Issue which is coded 1 if the incompatibility is fought over government and 0 
if it is fought over territory (UCDP, 2006).  
Peacekeeping forces have been found to play a key role in the post-settlement 
phase by increasing the duration of peace (Fortna, 2003). In addition, it has been 
proposed that UN peacekeepers may be more ‘neutral’ than regional peacekeepers 
(Zahar, 2003: 117). Hence, I control for UN Peacekeeping, which is coded 1 if a 
peacekeeping operation led by the United Nations was present in a given year, 0 
  13otherwise. I also control for Non-UN Peacekeeping, in order to capture whether other 
peacekeeping forces than the UN were deployed. This variable is coded similarly to 
the  UN Peacekeeping variable. For a description of the data used, see Heldt & 
Wallensteen (2006). Finally, in line with previous research I control for the type of 
deal reached, since agreements with power sharing provisions could be more likely to 
see peace endure (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Hence, the dummy variable Power 
Sharing was coded 1 if the agreement contained at least one pact concerning the 




Results and Analysis 
From my theoretical argument it was possible to derive five testable implications, and 
the results from the statistical analysis are presented in Table I and II.
17 In all models, 
the hazard ratios are reported rather than the coefficients. A hazard ratio above one 
increases the risk of post-settlement violence, whereas a value below one decreases 
the risk of post-settlement violence. To exemplify, a hazard ratio of 1.5 means that the 
risk of peace failing is increased by 50 %, and a hazard ratio of 0.7 indicates that the 
risk of peace failing is decreased by 30 %.
18 
I begin by examining the implications at the settlement level, and the first 
implication is assessed by looking at the peace duration for the signatories (Signatory 
Peace Duration). The first expectation that was derived from my argument proposes 
that whether a peace agreement is all-inclusive or not, should not affect the 
signatories’ commitment to peace. The variable Exclusive-Multiple shows the effect 
of an agreement that leaves out one or more actors versus a deal that includes all 
actors, in a multiparty context. The results indicate no statistically significant effect of 
the variable Exclusive-Multiple on the duration of peace for the signatories (Model 1, 
Table I). Hence, the result is in line with the theoretical argument that the signatories 
should have considered that the excluded parties might threaten the peace process, 
therefore not affecting the signatories’ commitment to peace. The effect even goes in 
the opposite direction to previous research, which has suggested that all-inclusive 
                                                 
16 This is coded in line with the definitions in Walter’s (2002a) war termination dataset (Nilsson, Svensson 
& Sundberg, 2006). 
17 For descriptive statistics, see the web appendix.  
18 All statistical analyses are carried out using Stata 10.0 (StataCorp, 2007). 
  14deals increase the prospects for peace. Indeed, if anything, the findings rather indicate 
that all-inclusive agreements make the signatories more likely to fight.
19 To see 
whether it may be sufficient that most, rather than all of the actors, have signed the 
deal, I estimated a model that includes a variable that captures the proportion between 
the number of signatories and the number of warring parties to a conflict. But no 
significant effect could be found. 
The second implication focuses on the overall peace, taking into account the 
conflict behavior of both signatories and non-signatories (Overall Peace Duration). 
The expectation is that an agreement leaving out one or more rebel groups should 
reduce the overall prospects for peace, since the excluded parties are likely to 
continue to fight. As can be seen in Model 2, Table I, the variable Exclusive-Multiple 
has a statistically significant effect at the 0.05 level concerning the overall peace 
duration, that is, when taking into account the conflict behavior of the signatories, as 
well as the non-signatories.
20 Hence, the result is in the expected direction, and shows 
that if an agreement excludes one or more rebel groups, the risk of post-settlement 
violence involving either signatories or non-signatories increases by 84%. Given that 
no such effect could be found when studying the conflict behavior of the signatories 
suggests that the prospects of overall peace are reduced, due to violence involving the 
non-signatories.
21 The results at the settlement level, however, only give us the 
general picture, and there is hence a need for a more fine-grained analysis focusing on 
the interactions between the government and the different rebel groups. 
 
[Table I in here] 
 
                                                 
19 One possible interpretation is that some actors that sign an all-inclusive agreement have done so due to 
outside pressure from a third party, and therefore signatories to such a deal may be more likely to resort to 
armed conflict (e.g. Werner & Yuen, 2005). 
20 It can be noted that in an alternative specification, using a linear measure of the number of parties, 
exclusion is no longer significant but is still in the expected direction. This alternative model, however, 
cannot at the same time account for the fact that agreements in two-party conflicts are all-inclusive by 
definition, which is an important aspect to consider.  
21 This is also in line with the expectation in previous research that all-inclusive deals may increase the 
prospects for peace, but notably such an effect cannot be found when only looking at the signatories. 
  15In the analysis at the dyadic level the focus is on the duration of peace for the 
government and each of the rebel groups (Dyadic Peace Duration).
22 The third 
expectation based on my argument stated that given the signing of a settlement in a 
conflict, on average, the non-signatories should be more likely to engage in post-
settlement violence than the signatories. The findings support this expectation, as the 
variable Excluded shows an increase in the risk that a dyad will engage in violence 
(Model 1, Table II).
23 If a rebel group is a non-signatory rather than a signatory, the 
risk of post-settlement armed conflict doubles, and the result is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. Put differently, if a rebel group has signed an agreement, such a 
group is more likely to see peace prevail compared to a rebel group on the outside of 
the deal. This is notable, since the results at the settlement level indicate that an all-
inclusive-agreement does not make the signatories any more likely to stick to peace. 
The results here at the dyadic level thus add an important piece of information, by 
showing that it does make a difference whether the parties sign settlements or not.  
 
[Table II in here] 
 
In an effort to probe deeper into the mechanisms, I explore if the exclusion of 
parties is affecting the signatories’ commitment to peace. Given that the fourth and 
fifth implications focus specifically on the signatories, the analysis is carried out on a 
sub-sample that consists of the signatory dyads. The fourth implication suggests that 
the signatories should not be any more likely to resort to violence if a deal excludes 
some of the parties. This is evaluated in Model 2, Table II, and the variable Exclusive-
Peace Agreement, shows no statistically significant effect on the risk of the 
signatories engaging in post-settlement armed conflict. This is in line with the 
argument, as the signatories should have taken into account whether some actor was 
                                                 
22 The models at the dyadic level have also been conducted on a sub-sample of the conflicts with multiple 
actors (since two-party conflicts are all-inclusive by definition), but the results remain the same.  
23 Since it is very rare that excluded parties are given anything in the peace agreement, I did not find it 
suitable to include the variable Power Sharing in this model. It can be noted that when doing so the variable 
Excluded is no longer statistically significant but still in the expected direction. I propose that the variable 
Power Sharing is best thought of as an intervening variable that may explain why some signatories stick to 
peace and others not.  
  16excluded from the agreement, and hence, it should not affect the signatories’ 
commitment to peace. 
The fifth and last implication takes this notion of exclusion one step further. 
Even if the signatories are faced with excluded parties that engage in conflict, we 
should not expect to see an increase in the risk of signatory violence. The variable 
Excluded-Fight, which captures whether there is one or more excluded groups that are 
engaged in conflict with the government, shows no statistically significant effect on 
the risk of signatories resorting to violence (Model 3, Table II). Hence, also this 
finding is in line with the argument put forward. While the peace process might be 
considerably more difficult if there are violent challenges to a peace deal, the results 
suggest that the exclusion of parties as such only makes outside actors more likely to 
engage in violence, and without necessarily increasing the risk that the signatory 
peace will fail. 
Taken together, the findings from evaluating the five implications are well in 
line with the theoretical argument suggesting that a deal that excludes some actor does 
not necessarily increase the risk that the signatories will engage in post-settlement 
violence. Indeed, a closer look at the data shows that there are several cases where the 
signatories stick to peace even when another warring party is left on the outside of the 
agreement. For example, the Philippine government in 1996 reached a settlement with 
the MNLF, and peace has prevailed in spite of continued violence involving the Abu 
Sayyaf, as well as the MILF.
24 Similarly, in Burundi, the signatories to the agreement 
reached in 2000, namely Frolina, Palipehutu and CNDD, did not return to armed 
warfare in spite of the fact that CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL continued to fight. 
Notably, in both conflicts the outside actors continued to fight, while the signatories 
remained committed to peace. 
Hence, partial peace agreements may be one possible path to peace. This is not 
to suggest that partial agreements necessarily are better than all-inclusive deals, 
indeed, the results show that excluded parties often continue to fight. This said, if 
some deals never are materialized because it is too difficult to get all parties to agree, 
then a partial agreement could be an attractive option. After all, a deal that excludes 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that armed conflict also came to involve the MNLF faction that emerged, whereas 
MNFL can be seen to have remained committed to peace. 
  17some actor may be successful in terms of getting the signatories to stop fighting.
25 In 
order to ascertain whether a partial agreement is better than no agreement at all, it 
would be preferable to study all conflicts (i.e. also those conflicts where no settlement 
has been reached), and compare the conflict behavior of the signatories to that of all 
non-signatories.
26 However, this lies outside the scope of this study. What can be 
done is to look at the duration of peace in substantive terms by comparing the 
signatories with the non-signatories in this particular sample. Using the program 
Clarify, the expected duration of peace for signatories and non-signatories is 
estimated, holding all other variables at their median values (Tomz, Wittenberg & 
King, 2001).
27 The result shows that the difference in peace duration is quite 
substantial, in particular considering that the study only covers the post-Cold War 
period. The expected peace duration for a rebel group that has signed an agreement is 
approximately eight years, whereas the corresponding figure for a non-signatory is 
only about two years. In other words, being a signatory instead of a non-signatory 
adds another six years of peace.
28 The findings here thus indicate that the signing of 
an agreement makes a substantial difference for peace. 
                                                
The results were obtained while controlling for a number of factors, and some 
of these are shown to significantly affect the risk that peace fails following a 
settlement. The models focus on different dimensions of peace, and hence, it is not 
surprising that the results are not the same across all models. I will briefly present a 
few of the most notable findings. The results on the settlement level show that the 
 
25 Occasionally the signatories stop fighting already some time before the agreement is signed. This could 
lead one to suspect that the decision to stop fighting led to the signing of the settlement, and not the other 
way around. However, even if a group stops fighting before the signing of a deal, they may have done so in 
the anticipation of a future deal. The fact that the government agrees to sign an agreement and thereby 
granting concessions suggests that they continue to pose a military treat. 
26 For instance, there might be some kind of selection effect taking place. This is, however, only a problem 
if there is some underlying factor that explains both why parties sign agreements and why they stick to 
peace. 
27 Note that Clarify cannot be used with a Cox model and does not allow for stratification. Instead, I 
employed a Weibull model without stratification, and the expected values should be seen as indicative only. 
Moreover, since peace duration is measured one year after the agreement, I have subtracted one year from 
the values given by Clarify. 
28 Looking only at the partial agreements, the expected peace duration is six years for the signatories, 
compared to only one and a half year for the non-signatories, hence, there is still a substantive difference.  
  18intensity of the conflict is found to significantly affect the risk that peace fails. This is 
in line with previous findings showing that particularly deadly wars are more likely to 
see the conflict resume (Fortna, 2003). Furthermore, if agreements include some form 
of power sharing, there is an increased chance of peace prevailing, which is in 
accordance with previous research (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). It can also be noted 
that, at the dyadic level it is found that the risk that a dyad will engage in conflict 
increases if the conflict is fought over government rather than territory. Finally, 
concerning the role of third parties, the findings at the dyadic level indicate that the 
non-UN peacekeeping forces are not very encouraging in terms of creating conditions 
for durable peace. 
In addition to controlling for these factors identified in previous research, a 
number of alternative specifications and statistical tests were carried out.
29 To 
ascertain that no particular case is driving the results, I have identified outliers using 
deviance residuals, and re-estimated the models without the outliers, but the results 
remain the same. Moreover, a potentially influential case is Chad, where many partial 
agreements have been signed, thus, as a robustness check I include a dummy variable 
for this conflict, but this does not affect the results. Furthermore, in the models at the 
dyadic level, I tried some alternative measures of the variable Number of Parties, but 
the results hold also when using a dummy, capturing whether it was multiparty 
conflict or not, and when adding a square term of the linear measure in order to 
explore curvilinear effects. Moreover, the results remain the same when controlling 
for the type of political system and the level of economic development measured in 
                                                 
29 I test the assumption that the hazard is proportional by performing tests based on the scaled Schoenfeld 
residuals, and both covariate-specific and global tests are carried out. Some of the global and covariate-
specific tests indicated violations of the assumption concerning the models at the dyadic level. To deal with 
this issue, I have interacted one of the violated variables with log(t), and added this new variable to the 
models, and then carried out these tests again (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004: 132–136). The tests then 
show no signs of violations, and the results are very similar to the previous results. Hence, the original 
models are the ones presented in Table II. Furthermore, as an additional robustness check, I reestimated 
the model using a Weibull model, but the main results do not change. The results are also robust to 
alternative specifications such as clustering on conflict or country. In addition, since new parties may 
emerge I used an alternative dependent variable at the settlement level that captures post-settlement 
violence involving a signatory, non-signatory, or a new party. The findings were basically the same as those 
obtained when examining the overall peace duration. 
  19the log of GDP per capita.
30 In sum, the various specifications show very similar 
results. 
 
                                                 
30 The data on GDP comes from the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (United Nations, 
2006). The type of political system was examined using data from the Polity IV data set, and the variable 
Polity ranges from –10 to +10, where a higher score indicates a more democratic system. In order to 
control for a possible curvilinear relationship I also used the variable Polity-squared measured as the square 
of the Polity variable (Marshall & Jaggers, 2003). 
  20Conclusions 
This article set out to evaluate the claim in previous research that all-inclusive peace 
agreements are more likely to provide durable peace than partial agreements that 
leave out one or more rebel groups. Applying insights from bargaining theory it was 
proposed that the signatories should be able to anticipate the risk of violent challenges 
from outside actors, and hence, not affect their commitment to peace. Indeed, whereas 
excluded parties are likely to continue to fight, the signatories when signing a deal 
should already have considered such a scenario. The findings of this study accord 
with these theoretical expectations. The results showed that whether an agreement 
leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace, but partial 
agreements can reduce the overall prospects for peace. Also in line with my argument, 
the study showed that outside actors are more likely to engage in post-settlement 
violence than the signatories. Importantly, the findings indicated that even if parties 
are excluded, and continue to fight, this does not affect the signatories’ commitment 
to peace. 
This study contributes to the scholarly literature in several ways. To begin 
with, by moving away from a characterization of civil war as involving only two 
parties and considering all rebel groups, this article contributes to the recent studies 
that in various ways attempt to take the empirical analysis one step further by 
disaggregating the study of civil war (e.g. Cunningham, 2006; Cunningham, 
Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2007; Nilsson, 2006; Svensson, 2007). Furthermore, by taking 
into account all rebel groups it became possible to incorporate insights from case 
studies into the quantitative analysis, which facilitated an inquiry into the global 
patterns of inclusive peace agreements and durable peace. The finding that 
agreements that leave out some actor reduce the overall prospects for peace is in line 
with previous arguments, but to the extent that scholars on this topic have suggested 
that all-inclusive deals may affect the signatories’ commitment to peace, the results 
here suggest otherwise (e.g. Rubin, 2002). The analysis also shed some light on our 
understanding of spoilers (e.g. Downs & Stedman, 2002; Stedman, 1997). While 
spoiler attacks in various ways may influence a peace process, this study indicates 
that the exclusion of rebel groups from a settlement does not necessarily disrupt the 
peace among the signatories. This said, the exclusion of actors might play a role in 
specific cases, and in some instances result in intensification in violence. Hence, more 
research on this topic is needed. 
  21Furthermore, one implication of the argument that the warring parties are 
forward-looking is that some agreements never materialize if the parties deem the 
prospects for peace so bleak that they see no point in signing a deal at all. Therefore, 
a fruitful avenue for future research is to study this prior stage in the bargaining 
process. Such an inquiry may also serve to address the issue of whether a partial 
agreement is better than no agreement at all. Related to this, it would be interesting to 
study if there are certain types of groups that sign agreements and how this may 
influence the duration of peace. 
The result that all-inclusive agreements do not affect the signatories’ 
commitment to peace is perhaps less discouraging than it first appears. An important 
conclusion from the present study for policymakers is that it may be worthwhile for 
third parties to try to facilitate agreements even if it proves difficult or even 
impossible to bring all the parties to sign a deal. Indeed, the results demonstrate that 
even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the 
signatories’ commitment to peace. Hence, this study shows that partial peace is 
possible. 
 
  22Table I. All-Inclusive Deals and the Risk of Post-Settlement Conflict: Settlement Level 
 
  Signatory Peace Duration  Overall Peace Duration 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Exclusive-Multiple 0.750  1.843** 
 (0.93)  (2.25) 
Two-Party Conflict  0.739  0.786 
 (0.81)  (0.77) 
Conflict Duration  0.986  1.028* 
 (0.49)  (1.94) 
Conflict Intensity  2.433***  1.679** 
 (2.69)  (2.41) 
Conflict Issue  1.959  1.120 
 (1.56)  (0.45) 
UN Peacekeeping  0.840  0.629 
 (0.43)  (1.22) 
Non-UN Peacekeeping  0.956  1.288 
 (0.12)  (0.99) 
Power Sharing  0.506*  0.515** 
 (1.77)  (2.31) 







No. of Failures  29  45 
Log Likelihood  -113.281  -184.757 
Note: A Cox proportional hazards model is employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are 
reported, with robust z statistics (given in parentheses) clustered on conflict. *Statistically significant at 
the .10 level. **Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Two-tailed tests are used. Stata 10.0 was used to generate the statistical results. 
 
  23Table II. Exclusion and the Risk of Post-Settlement Conflict: Dyadic Level 
 
 Dyadic  Peace 
Duration 
Dyadic Peace Duration (Signatories) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
      
Excluded 2.001***     
 (3.16)     
Exclusive-Peace 
Agreement 
 1.139   
   (0.31)   
Excluded-Fight     1.045 
     (0.09) 
Number of Parties  1.144  1.124  1.149 
 (1.34)  (0.59)  (0.66) 
Dyad-Conflict Duration  0.996  1.013  1.014 
 (0.26)  (0.44)  (0.46) 
Dyad-Conflict Intensity  1.300  1.027  1.048 
 (1.06)  (0.07)  (0.13) 
Conflict Issue  1.724**  3.027**  2.992** 
 (2.14)  (2.01)  (2.03) 
UN Peacekeeping  0.599  1.000  0.988 
 (1.55)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Non-UN Peacekeeping  2.050***  2.537***  2.533*** 
 (2.84)  (2.77)  (2.79) 
Power Sharing    0.566  0.567 









No. of Failures  62 33  33 
Log Likelihood  -220.280  -104.411  -104.436 
Note: A Cox proportional hazards model is employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are 
reported, with robust z statistics (given in parentheses) clustered on dyad. *Statistically significant at 
the .10 level. **Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Two-tailed tests are used. Stata 10.0 was used to generate the statistical results.  
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